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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Congress overrode President Bill Clinton's veto and
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), a key
purpose of which was to put securities class actions under the control
of institutional investors with large financial stakes in the outcome of
the litigation.' The theory behind this policy, set out in a famous
article by Professors Elliot Weiss and John Beckerman, 2 was simple:
self-interest should encourage investors with large stakes to run class
actions in ways that maximize recoveries for all investors. These
investors should naturally want to hire good lawyers, incentivize them
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3), 78u-4(a)(3) (2012)
(establishing procedural guidelines for determining lead plaintiffs); 141 CONG. REc. S19,180
(daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995) (noting the Senate override); 141 CONG. REC. H15,214, H15,223-24
(daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (noting the House override); Presidential Message to the House of
Representatives Returning Without Approval the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2210 (Dec. 19, 1995) (veto).
2. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How




properly, monitor their actions, and reject cheap settlements. In other
words, control by large investors should reduce agency costs, which
can be severe when securities class actions are run by lawyers who
may be essentially unsupervised because their clients' stakes are
small. This reduced risk of opportunism should alleviate the need for
judges to police the conduct of class counsel as well.
By giving large investors control of securities-fraud class
actions, the PSLRA expresses greater confidence in private
arrangements than in judicial regulation, which failed to protect
investors sufficiently in the past. Initially, Congress's confidence in
private arrangements seemed misplaced because institutional
investors rarely volunteered to serve as lead plaintiffs. 3 The statute
created no incentives motivating them to serve,4 so they remained on
the sidelines as they had before.5 Over time, however, a series of
developments brought more public pension funds into the fray.6 The
publicity that attended the scandals involving Enron, WorldCom,
Tyco, and Cendant likely played an important role, as did the
enormous recoveries obtained in those cases.7 Lawyers seeking
appointments as lead counsel also contributed by building
relationships with institutional investors. Law firms wined and dined
3. See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 § VI(C)(1) (1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/lreform.txt (examining the effects of the PSLRA).
4. See Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of
Collective Institutional Investor Activism in Litigation, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 559, 603-04 (1996)
(describing the shortcomings of the PSLRA in incentivizing institutional investors to serve as
plaintiffs).
5. The SEC found that institutions served as lead plaintiffs in only 8 of 105 cases filed in
the first year after passage of the PSLRA. See U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, supra note 3.
6. By 2002, public and union pension fund participation had grown to 27.2% of filed cases.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2005 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 21 (2006). The percentage
peaked in 2007 at 57%. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERs LLP, THE EVER-CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF
LITIGATION COMES FULL CIRCLE 2011 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 27 (2012), available at
http://www.pwc.com/enUS/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/201 1-securities-litigation-
study.pdf. In subsequent years, institutions appeared as lead plaintiffs in just under 40% of filed
cases, a substantially higher rate than before passage of the PSLRA. Id.; see also Charles Silver
& Sam Dinkin, Incentivizing Institutional Investors to Serve as Lead Plaintiffs in Securities
Fraud Class Actions, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 471, 472 (2007) (discussing the failure to build into the
PSLRA incentives for investors to participate as lead plaintiffs).
7. For discussions, see Stephen J. Choi, A. C. Pritchard & Jill E. Fisch, Do Institutions
Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 879 (2005) (identifying factors that impacted institutional participation);
Michael Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An Empirical Analysis of Public
Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 368, 375
(2012) (discussing role of corporate scandals in incentivizing institutional participation).
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investment managers, volunteered to monitor institutional portfolios
for signs of fraud, and made campaign contributions to politicians who
had influence or control over public pension funds in what some have
suggested are pay-to-play relationships.8 Today, institutional
investors are important players in securities-fraud class actions.
Now that institutional investors are participating more often, it
remains to consider whether the mechanism created by the PSLRA is
working as anticipated. Are large investors improving the
performance of securities class actions by reducing agency costs? The
early evidence was inconclusive. Researchers initially found that
"institutional participation . . . correlated with larger settlements,"9
but it was not clear whether "this result [was] really the product of
enhanced institutional monitoring" rather than of cherry-picking by
institutions, which preferred to become involved in cases that were
larger and easier to pursue.10 Recently, however, one of us (Perino)
studied a large and rich data set of settled securities class actions.
Perino found that public institutional investors extracted larger
recoveries on securities-fraud claims than other types of lead
plaintiffs, even controlling for case characteristics, and exerted
economically significant downward pressure on fees. "On average, fee
requests [were] 5.3 percent less and fee awards [were] 3.4 percent less
than in cases without public pension funds [as the lead plaintiff]." 1
Moreover, participation by these kinds of institutional
investors may have had an important spillover effect. As fee awards
declined in cases led by public pension funds, they also fell in other
securities class actions. 12 Federal district court judges may provide the
connection. Opinions and orders in cases with institutional lead
8. On the role of "pay-to-play" arrangements, see Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-
Skinner & A.C. Pritchard, The Price of Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 650, 678 (2011); Silver & Dinkin, supra note 6, at 478-88; David H. Webber, Is
"Pay-to-Play" Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in Securities Class Actions?, 90 B.U. L. REV.
2031, 2080-81 (2010).
9. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Lead Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1588-93 (2006);
James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffs and ... There Are Plaintiffs:
An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 VAND. L. REV. 355, 367 (2008);.
Perino, supra note 7, at 369-70 (citing C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., Institutional Monitoring through
Shareholder Litigation, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 356 (2010)).
10. Choi et al., supra note 7, at 900-01. To the extent that this cherry-picking means that
the "better" cases were pursued more vigorously, and less good cases were pursued less
frequently, that would also be likely to result in a net social gain.
11. Perino, supra note 7, at 369.
12. Id. at 370.
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plaintiffs are more likely to be published. 13 Fee awards in securities
class actions are also closely followed by academics.' 4 Both sources
make it relatively easy for district court judges (and the lawyers and
experts who appear before them) to follow trends in fee regulation. In
effect, dissemination of information regarding the fees that
sophisticated institutional investors negotiated with class counsel may
create a market for fees where one did not exist before. Courts could
then rely on those market rates for setting fees in securities cases led
by individual investors, union funds, and others.
There is, then, important evidence that the mechanism created
by the PSLRA is reducing certain agency costs. Why it is doing so is
unclear, however. As Professors Choi, Fisch, and Pritchard explain:
"The theory [underlying the lead-plaintiff provision of the PSLRA] was
that an institutional investor with a substantial damages claim would
have the incentive to bargain hard with class counsel on behalf of the
class, reducing the percentage of the recovery awarded to class
counsel."15 Is the predicted bargaining over attorneys' fees occurring?
Or might agency costs be lower in securities class actions led by
institutional investors for a different reason? An alternative
mechanism could run through judges. The presence of an institutional
investor could signal to the presiding judge that a case is especially
meritorious, entailing a lower risk of nonrecovery. The judge might
then demand better performance from class counsel or award lower
fees. If judges are responsible for reduced agency costs, however, the
PSLRA is not working as intended. Public regulation, rather than
private ordering, still carries the load.
To learn how the mechanism created by the PSLRA is working
on the ground, we studied securities class actions that settled between
2007 and 2011 in the three federal district courts that processed the
largest numbers of these cases: the Central District of California, the
Northern District of California, and the Southern District of New
York. Briefly stated, we found little evidence that ex ante fee
agreements play a role in the process for selecting lead plaintiffs.' 6 At
the settlement-approval and fee-award stages, however, we found that
13. Id. at 373.
14. For recent studies of fee awards in class actions generally, see Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class Action Settlements: 1993-2008, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 248-52 (2010); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class
Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 811-14 (2010).
15. Choi et al., supra note 7, at 869-70.
16. By an "ex ante fee agreement," we mean an agreement regarding attorneys' fees whose
terms are negotiated prior to the filing of an investor's application to be appointed lead plaintiff.
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lawyers more frequently invoked such agreements to support their
requested fee and that courts deferred to attorneys' fee requests more
often in cases with evidence of an ex ante fee agreement. We further
found evidence of an ex ante fee agreement or of a proxy for such an
agreement (specifically, the presence of a public pension fund as the
lead plaintiff) to be correlated with statistically and economically
significant reductions in fee requests and awards, as well as with
greater judicial deference to the requested fee. Overall, the court
awarded a lower fee than the class counsel requested in about 18% of
the cases we reviewed, a somewhat higher percentage than we had
anticipated.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the selection
mechanisms for lead plaintiff and class counsel contained in the
PSLRA and shows how they might facilitate ex ante fee setting. Part
III sets out our study design and discusses our empirical findings in
greater depth. Part IV contains brief concluding remarks.
II. THE PSLRA's MECHANISMS FOR SELECTING THE LEAD PLAINTIFF
AND CLASS COUNSEL AND FOR SETTING ATTORNEYS' FEES
When it enacted the PSLRA, Congress sought to use
institutional investors' superior information and incentives to improve
the operation of securities class actions.17 Because institutional
investors are sophisticated clients who can offer lawyers repeat
business, they potentially have the ability to choose good class action
lawyers, monitor them effectively, and bargain with them for lower
fees.
The language of the PSLRA describes how the mechanism is
supposed to work. After notice of a class action lawsuit is sent to all
investors via publication in "[either a] widely circulated national
business-oriented publication or wire service," investors interested in
serving as lead plaintiff have sixty days to file motions nominating
themselves for the position.'8 The trial court judge must then review
any competing applications and is required to give control of the case
to the "most adequate plaintiff" (i.e., the investor found to be the "most
capable of adequately representing the interests of class members").19
17. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
731 (noting Congress's intent to "increase the likelihood that parties with significant holdings in
issuers, whose interests are more strongly aligned with the class of shareholders, will participate
in the litigation and exercise control over the selection and actions of plaintiffs counsel").
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(A), 78u-4(a)(3)(A) (2012).
19. Id. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(i), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i).
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The PSLRA imposes a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff is
the applicant which has "the largest financial interest in the relief
sought by the class" and which "otherwise satisfies the requirements
of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."20 Once appointed,
the lead plaintiff is required, "subject to the approval of the court, [to]
select and retain counsel to represent the class."2 1 Finally, the statute
limits the total attorneys' fees and expenses that may be awarded to
"a reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and
prejudgment interest actually paid to the class."2 2
A. The PSLRA Requires Lead Plaintiffs to "Select and Retain" Class
Counsel
The PSLRA's text and underlying policy suggest that a would-
be lead plaintiff should address compensation when it selects lead
counsel. The phrase "select and retain" implies that a lead plaintiff
will do more than just choose a law firm to represent it and the other
members of the class; it could be read to require a lead plaintiff to
actually hire the law firm and set the terms of its compensation as
well. This conclusion follows from the definition of "retain," which,
when used in connection with lawyers, commonly refers to the
payment of initial compensation, known colloquially as a "retainer," or
to the act of engagement, which normally includes an agreement on
the lawyers' compensation terms.23 The conclusion that the word
"retain" includes setting compensation also comports with the canon of
statutory construction that multiple related words be given different
20. Id. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
21. Id. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(v), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).
22. Id. §§ 77z-1(a)(6), 78u-4(a)(6).
23. The following dictionaries available online contain the indicated definitions of the
transitive form of the verb "retain": retain, v., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2(b), available at
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/164150#eid25737172 ("To engage (a lawyer, esp. a barrister) by
the payment of a preliminary fee, in order to secure his or her services if required"); retain (verb),
MERRIAM-WEBSTER UNABRIDGED 2(b), available at http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/
unabridged/retain ("[To keep in one's pay or service; specifically: to employ by paying a
retainer"); retain - definition, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY 3, available at http://www.mac
millandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/retain ("[T]o employ a professional person such as a
lawyer or doctor by paying an amount of money called a retainer before the work is done");
retain, OXFORD DICTIONARIES 4, available at http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
english/retain?q=retain ("[(To] secure the services of (a barrister) with a preliminary payment");
retain, THE FREE DICTIONARY 4, available at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/retain ("To hire
(an attorney, for example) by the payment of a fee"); What is RETAIl, THE LAW DICTIONARY,
http://thelawdictionary.org/retain/#ixzz2gbL7MCf8 ("To engage the services of an attorney or
counselor to manage a cause").
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meanings to avoid redundancies. 24 Because the PSLRA says that a
lead plaintiff must "select and retain" class counsel, retention must
include something more than identifying or choosing. The natural
complement is hiring or engaging, which normally includes setting
compensation terms.
If the preceding interpretation is correct, then the PSLRA
anticipates that lead plaintiffs will set compensation terms for class
counsel (subject to judicial review, as explained below). This
assignment of responsibility makes sense because a sophisticated lead
plaintiff with a large financial stake in the case and substantial
experience in securities litigation should have good information about
both the identity of the "right" lawyer for the case and the "right" fee
for the lawyer to be paid. To obtain the best combination of quality
and price, a plaintiff must evaluate the facts and bargain with
attorneys. Sophisticated lead plaintiffs can do both because law firms
compete openly for their business. This competitive process enables
institutional investors to evaluate lawyers' track records and
credentials, assess the "fit" between lawyer and client, compare
requested compensation terms, and use the prospect of future
business to extract concessions.
Evidence from the early days of institutional investor activism
in securities class actions shows institutions engaging in this kind of
sophisticated evaluative process. In 2002, Jill Fisch surveyed the
practices that institutions employed when contemplating filing suit
under the PSLRA and found that they largely mimicked the kind of
arm's length bargaining that corporations used to retain counsel. 25
Among other things, anecdotal evidence showed that institutions sent
out requests for proposals, conducted beauty contests, and fielded
large numbers of unsolicited inquiries from law firms seeking to
represent them in these cases.26 Institutions generally sought to
balance price and quality when selecting lead counsel and universally
expressed an unwillingness to look solely at which firm submitted the
24. See Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2196 (2011) (expressing the Court's general reluctance to treat statutory terms as
surplusage); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995) ("[W]e assume that Congress used
two terms because it intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning."). It
bears noting that states' professional disciplinary rules require contingent fee agreements to be
"in a writing signed by the client" and to "state the method by which the fee is to be determined,
including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of
settlement, trial or appeal." See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2013).
25. Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel
by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 710 (2002).
26. Id. at 705-06.
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lowest bid.27 Nonetheless, the competition among qualified law firms
gave institutions significant leverage in negotiating fee
arrangements. 28 In conducting those negotiations, institutions were
apparently quite sensitive to agency-cost issues.29
Professors Weiss and Beckerman anticipated that lead
plaintiffs would handle fees differently than judges, 30 predicting that
institutional investors might jettison the judicial practice known as
"the increase/decrease rule," according to which the fee percentage
declines as the recovery grows. 3' "To encourage its attorneys to pursue
strong cases more vigorously, an institution might agree to pay them
an increasing portion of any recovery in excess of some stipulated
threshold ... ."32 In fact, some lead plaintiffs have used
"increase/increase" fee arrangements. 33 Most famously, the Board of
Regents for the University of California did so in the Enron litigation,
which recovered $7.2 billion for investors.3 4 After approving the
settlement, Judge Melinda Harmon based the fee award on the sliding
scale provided in the attorneys' fee agreement, which entitled the
lawyers to 8% of the first $1 billion recovered, 9% of the second $1
billion, and 10% of all dollars recovered above that amount.35 The total
fee awarded was $688 million.36
B. Case Law Bearing on the Submission of Fee Agreements
In keeping with the analysis of the PSLRA offered in the
preceding Section, some courts have encouraged trial judges to
consider fee agreements when setting fees. In re Cendant Corp.
Litigation is the most prominent case.37 There, the Third Circuit
27. Id. at 706-08.
28. Id. at 708-09.
29. Id.
30. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 2, at 2107 (speculating that lead plaintiffs'




33. Under an "increase/decrease" regime, the percentage attorneys' fee declines as the size
of the recovery grows. Under an "increase/increase" agreement, the opposite occurs; that is, the
fee percentage rises as more dollars are recovered. Both arrangements typically set out various
"tiers" for the gross recovery and corresponding attorneys' fees.
34. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 732, 740 (S.D. Tex.
2008).
35. Id. at 769-78.
36. Id. at 740.
37. In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d. Cir. 2001).
16852013]1
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rejected an attempt by a district judge to auction the role of lead
counsel, pointing out that the PSLRA empowered the lead plaintiff "to
select and retain" counsel for the class.3 8 That allocation of authority
made sense, the court wrote, because, "at least in the typical case, a
properly-selected lead plaintiff is likely to do as good [as] or [a] better
job than the court" when it comes to choosing counsel and setting
fees. 39 The trial judge's job is to ensure that the lead plaintiff "fairly
and adequately represent[s] the interests of the class."4 0 "[O]ne of the
best ways" a trial judge can do this, the Third Circuit wrote, is by
"inquir[ing] whether [a lead plaintiff candidate] has demonstrated a
willingness and ability to select competent class counsel and to
negotiate a reasonable retainer agreement with that counsel."41
Somewhat surprisingly, the Third Circuit's explicit inclusion of
fee-related matters in the adequacy assessment has not reduced the
size of attorneys' fees that are requested or awarded. Just the opposite
seems to have occurred. In a recent study, Eisenberg, Miller, and
Perino found that fee awards in the Third Circuit were significantly
higher than those in the Second Circuit, even controlling for case
characteristics. 4 2 The Third Circuit was not exceptional in this regard.
Eight other circuits also awarded fees significantly above those meted
out in the Second Circuit.43 However, the Third Circuit did stand out
when it came to fee requests. It was the only circuit in which fee
requests were significantly higher than those in the Second Circuit. 44
Although courts generally appeared to tread lightly when reviewing
fee requests (on average awarding attorneys approximately 90% of
their requested fees), there was some evidence that the Third Circuit
was even more deferential. 45 The authors did not explore what, if any,
38. Id. at 275.
39. Id. at 276.
40. Id. at 266.
41. Id. at 265.
42. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller & Michael A. Perino, A New Look at Judicial
Impact: Attorneys' Fees in Securities Class Actions After Goldberger v. Integrated Resources, Inc.,
29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 5, 28 (2009).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. In the median case, the ratio of the fee award to the fee request was 1.00-the
attorneys received exactly what they requested. Id. at 20. In the subsample of cases in which the
court awarded something less than the requested fee, the coefficient for the Third Circuit
variable was positive and significant, meaning that in those cases, district courts in the Third
Circuit awarded attorneys a greater proportion of the requested fees than courts in the reference
group of Second Circuit cases. Id. at 30. Again, however, the Third Circuit was not alone. Id. The
other circuits where the variable was positive and significant were the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. Id.
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causal link exists between the Third Circuit's standard for selecting
lead plaintiffs and the fee requests and awards in that jurisdiction.
One difficulty in establishing such a link is that courts outside
of the Third Circuit rarely consider retainer agreements or other
evidence of hard bargaining when assessing the adequacy of a
proposed lead plaintiff.4 6 One exceptional case is In re Razorfish
Securities Litigation.47 There, Judge Rakoff rejected a proposal to
auction the role of lead counsel as being inconsistent with the
statutory language and far too intrusive.48 As in Cendant, however,
the court still saw a role for itself, although in doing so it blended
together the technically distinct tasks of selecting the lead plaintiff
and approving the lead plaintiffs choice of lead counsel. Noting that
an "excessive compensation proposal can cast in doubt the ability of
proposed lead counsel to adequately represent the class," the court
required the prospective lead counsel to submit its negotiated fee
arrangements under seal.49 After review, Judge Rakoff found that one
proposal "was excessive both in terms of the other submissions and in
terms of the nature of this particular case" and offered that counsel an
opportunity to resubmit.50 Counsel then submitted a lower proposal.51
In the court's view, this.kind of gentle nudge was preferable to having
the judge at the center of the process of picking counsel and setting
fees. 52 "Unlike an auction system," Judge Rakoff wrote, "such modest
46. See In re Luxottica Grp., S.P.A. Sec. Litig., No. 01-CV-3285, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21130, at *13-20 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2004) (looking to the retainer agreement when approving the
lead plaintiffs choice of lead counsel); Craig v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049-
50 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (considering fee agreements and other evidence of negotiation in assessing the
proposed lead plaintiff); In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 219 F.R.D. 343, 354 (D. Md.
2003) (looking to fee agreement in choosing the lead plaintiff from among the remaining
movants); Taft v. Ackermans, No. 02 Civ. 7951(PKL), 2003 WL 402789, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
20, 2003) ("[I]f the proposed fee agreement was outside the bounds of reason, that would
certainly be evidence that the proposed lead counsel would not fairly represent the class.");
Raftery v. Mercury Fin. Co., No. 97 C 624, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12439, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7,
1997) ("[W] hile the statute does provide for the award of fees based on the ultimate recovery, this
court does not believe this statutory language prevents the court from considering what an
attorney expects to take from the recovery in determining whether the presumptively most
adequate plaintiff is in fact the most adequate plaintiff.").
47. In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
48. Id. at 311. With respect to whether auctions were permitted under the PSLRA, the
court noted that "[bly no reasonable reading of this language can the Court's right to disapprove
lead plaintiff's choice of counsel be transmogrified into a right to arrange a shot-gun marriage
between strangers." Id. at 310.
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intervention by the Court is fully consistent with the mandate of the
Reform Act that the lead plaintiffs selection and retention of counsel
be subject to a court approval that is meaningful and not simply
perfunctory."53
The cases where the court explicitly considered evidence of ex
ante bargaining over fees to be relevant in appointing the lead
plaintiff are a tiny minority. Even when investors compete for the lead
plaintiff position-and where success might conceivably depend on
proof that one negotiated the best fee terms for the class-most courts
do not make a deep or searching inquiry into the matter. Victory turns
almost exclusively on which candidate has the largest financial
interest.54 The candidate who wins this battle usually garners the
position and need only show that its choice of counsel and negotiated
fee terms are reasonable. 5
Given that the size of investors' financial stakes carries most of
the weight in the battle to be appointed the lead plaintiff, the relative
unimportance of information about fees is unsurprising.56 In many
53. Id.
54. See MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION UNDER THE PSLRA § 2.04 B.1 (2012)
("The key issue in applying the most adequate plaintiff presumption is determining which
plaintiff has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class.").
55. See, e.g., Herrgott v. U.S. Dist. Court (Cavanaugh), 306 F.3d 726, 732-33 (9th Cir.
2002) (reversing the district court's denial of the position of lead plaintiff to the candidate with
the largest financial interest because the candidate's choice of counsel and fee arrangement was
reasonable and the district court had no authority to select for the class what it considered to be
the best lawyer or fee schedule).
56. In some cases, the financial stakes are so far apart that the class member with the
smaller stake withdraws its motion or puts up only token opposition to the motion of the
presumptively most adequate plaintiff. See, e.g., City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Horizon
Lines, Inc., No. 08-969, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62572, at *2 (D. Del. June 18, 2009) (stating that
a class member withdrew its motion for appointment as lead plaintiff upon reviewing a motion
for lead plaintiff by another member with a larger financial interest in the case). In cases where
the stakes are similar in size, however, there is often a spirited fight over such matters as the
proper accounting measure to be used to calculate the largest financial interest. See, e.g.,
Ellenberg v. JA Solar Holdings Co., 262 F.R.D. 262, 265-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (determining which
investor had the largest financial interest without regard to competing accounting methods when
one investor argued that the use of "First-In, First-Out" ("FIFO') instead of "Last-In, Last-Out"
("LIFO") overstated the other investor's loss); In re Doral Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 414 F. Supp. 2d
398, 403 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (recognizing the difficulty of determining the largest financial stake
when it was not clear which accounting methods the parties used and stating that FIFO has
fallen out of favor in the district due to its "tendency to overstate the losses of institutional
investors and to understate gains made from stock sold during the class period"). Other cases
examine whether in-and-out trades during the class period should be included in the calculation,
see In re K-V Pharm. Co. Sec. Litig., No. 11CV01816 AGF, 2012 WL 1570118, at *4 (E.D. Mo.
May 3, 2012) (holding that courts should look only at "recoverable losses caused by the alleged
fraud-on-the-market when determining lead plaintiff in a securities class action"); Perlmutter v.
Intuitive Surgical, Inc., No. 10-CV-03451-LHK, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16813, at *17 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 15, 2011) (holding that a likely inability to prove loss causation "make[s] it less likely that
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cases, the evidence concerning a lead plaintiffs choice of counsel
appears to consist of little more than the prospective lead counsel's
firm resume.57 Although the PSLRA permits discovery into matters
bearing on the adequacy of a candidate for lead plaintiff,58 discovery
rarely occurs in practice. And without discovery, class members
hoping to show that the candidate with the largest stake is inadequate
are unlikely to possess information about fee arrangements unless the
presumptive lead plaintiff volunteers it or the court asks for it.
Nor is a class member competing for the role of lead plaintiff
likely to establish the inadequacy of the candidate with the largest
financial stake by showing that it negotiated better fee terms for the
class. Under prevailing law, to keep the presumption of adequacy, the
candidate with the largest stake need only retain counsel on
reasonable terms, not the best terms. In In re Cavanaugh, for example,
the court found that it had no authority to select
what it considers to be the best possible lawyer or the lawyer offering the best possible
fee schedule. . . . Rather, such information is relevant only to determine whether the
presumptive lead plaintiffs choice of counsel is so irrational, or so tainted by self-
plaintiffs can recover losses incurred prior to the disclosure of a defendant's fraudulent conduct
and thus provide greater justification for excluding those losses in any calculation of a potential
lead plaintiffs financial interest in the litigation."), whether the calculation should include any
postclass increase in the stock price, compare Foley v. Transocean Ltd., 272 F.R.D. 126, 130
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (advocating use of PSLRA bounce back rule), with In re Gen. Elec. Sec. Litig.,
No. 09 Civ. 1957(DC), 2009 WL 2259502, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009) (using bounce back rule
to determine largest financial interest), and even what the appropriate class period should be,
compare In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 818-19 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (holding that
the largest financial interest must be based on the class period stated in the notice for the first
filed action), with In re BP, PLC Sec. Litig., 758 F. Supp. 2d 428, 434 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (holding
that the longest, most inclusive class period should be used because it encompasses more
potential class members).
57. See, e.g., Bassin v. deCODE genetics, Inc., 230 F.R.D. 313, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(determining the adequacy of the lead plaintiffs counsel based on the submission of the
attorney's resume indicating that the attorney had previously served as lead counsel in several
securities-fraud class actions and the fact that the attorney was free of conflicts).
58. To obtain discovery on the most adequate plaintiff issue, a plaintiff must demonstrate
"a reasonable basis for a finding that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff is incapable of
adequately representing the class." 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iv), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2012); see
Hodges v. Immersion Corp., No. C-09-4073 MMC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122565, at *12-13
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) (holding that a putative class member was not entitled to discovery
where the class member did not present any evidence to support theory that presumptive lead
plaintiff would be incapable of adequately representing the class); In re Tronox, Inc., 262 F.R.D.
338, 347-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying request to conduct limited discovery where plaintiff did not
demonstrate a reasonable basis for it and noting that "such discovery will only cause
unnecessary delay and expense" and is "likely to provide results that are neither helpful nor
likely to change the outcome").
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dealing or conflict of interest, as to cast genuine and serious doubt on that plaintiffs
willingness or ability to perform the functions of lead plaintiff.5 9
As a result, the In re Cavanaugh court held that adequacy under Rule
23(a) cannot be judged according to "how advantageous an attorney's
fee deal [the prospective lead plaintiff] manages to negotiate."60 Under
this standard, information about fee terms can have little value in the
competition for the lead plaintiff role.
C. Summary
Sophisticated clients use contingent fee agreements negotiated
at the outset of a representation to set market-based compensation
terms that motivate lawyers to maximize gains. When Congress
enacted the PSLRA, it appears to have wanted lead plaintiffs to use
the same approach in securities class actions. This view fits nicely
with the statutory language requiring lead plaintiffs to "select and
retain" counsel for the classes they head.
The extent to which existing practices comport with Congress's
desire is not known. Only the Third Circuit requires district court
judges to consider fee agreements when appointing lead plaintiffs, but
even there, many district courts do not seem to do so. 61 The reported
59. Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 732-33 (citations omitted). Some district court decisions in the
Ninth Circuit prior to In re Cavanaugh appeared to conduct a much more searching inquiry,
similar to the Third Circuit approach, with respect to the fees negotiated between the lead
plaintiff and the proposed lead counsel. See Armour v. Network Assocs., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1044,
1055 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (appointing the class member with the largest financial interest as lead
plaintiff after performing an in camera review of the fee arrangement and determining it was
reasonable); In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 487-88 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (denying the
position of lead plaintiff to the class member with the largest financial interest because the court
concluded that another class member had negotiated a more favorable fee arrangement with
counsel).
60. Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 732.
61. See Steamfitters Local 449 Pension Fund v. Cent. European Distribution Corp., No. 11-
6247 (JBS/KMW), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118693, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2012) (accepting the
magistrate judge's recommendation to approve the lead plaintiffs choice of counsel without a
discussion of fee arrangements when the motion to appoint counsel was unopposed); Blake
Partners, Inc. v. Orbcomm, Inc., No. 07-4517, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43061, at *21-26 (D.N.J.
June 2, 2008) (noting that the Third Circuit requires courts to consider "whether the movant has
demonstrated a willingness and ability to . . . negotiate a reasonable retainer agreement with
that counsel" but neglecting to discuss the movant's fee arrangement); In re Sterling Fin. Corp.
Sec. Class Action, No. 07-2171, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93708, at *15-16 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2007)
(determining without describing the fee arrangement that the proposed lead plaintiff "has
demonstrated a willingness and ability to select competent class counsel and to negotiate a
reasonable retainer agreement with that counsel"); Lowrey v. Toll Bros., No. 07-1513, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 99501, at *10 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2007) (appointing lead plaintiff and expressing
confidence that it "will endeavor to negotiate a reasonable fee arrangement with counsel"); In re
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cases suggest that judges in other circuits rarely examine the fee
agreements. Differences between judges and lead plaintiffs also
remain unexplored. No one knows how often or to what extent judges
overrule lead plaintiffs when awarding fees. Nor have the fee formulas
used by judges and lead plaintiffs been compared. Although anecdotal
reports suggest that judges find the "increase/decrease" approach
more attractive than lead plaintiffs do, systematic evidence is lacking.
We do not even know whether, on the whole, judges or institutional
investors with large financial stakes tend to be more parsimonious
with regard to attorneys' fees.
III. THE DATA ON Ex ANTE AND Ex POST FEE SETTING
A. The Sample
Using the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, we
identified 165 class actions that settled from January 1, 2007, through
December 31, 2011,62 in three federal district courts: the Central
District of California (33), the Northern District of California (36), and
the Southern District of New York (96). These three districts were
chosen because they typically see the largest number of securities
class action filings,63 and we wanted to observe the behavior not only
of law firms and lead plaintiffs but also of judges experienced in
handling these matters. After obtaining docket sheets for all of these
cases, we determined that a number had been transferred to other
courts or otherwise dismissed, and we excluded these cases from the
sample. Our final sample thus consisted of 134 cases. Table 1 presents
summary statistics for the data set.
Able Labs. Sec. Litig., 425 F. Supp. 2d 562, 573-74 (D.N.J. 2006) (approving the lead plaintiffs
choice for counsel when the plaintiff described the negotiated fee arrangement to the court).
62. These cases were filed between June 2000 and December 2010.
63. One recent survey found that the Second and Ninth Circuits have been the lead circuits
for securities class action filings for every year since 1996. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
C.D. Cal. N.D. Cal. S.D.N.Y. Total
Cases
Settled 2007-2011 33 36 96 165
Excluded (Dismissed or 1 0 30 30
Transferred)
Included in Analyses 32 36 66 134
Cases with Identified No. of
Lead Plaintiffs
1 22 18 36 76
2 5 7 12 24
3 2 8 10 20
4 2 1 6 9
5 1 1 2 4
6 or More 0 1 0 1
Lead Plaintiff Type _
Public Pension Fund 13 11 24 48
Other Institution 10 17 16 43
Individual 9 8 26 43
Total 32 36 66 134
Settlement Amounts ($000s,
Constant 2012)
Total $1,451,669 $1,188,818 $3,187,276 $5,827,763
Mean $43,491 $33,023 $48,292 $43,491
Median $10,500 $9,576 $12,300 $11,000
25th Percentile $4,820 $4,651 $3,455 $4,052
75th Percentile $25,600 $19,300 $40,000 $31,000
Fee Requests (% of recovery)
Mean 21.9% 24.3% 24.5% 23.8%
Median 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0%
25th Percentile 17.8% 22.5% 19.3% 20.0%
75th Percentile 25.0% 28.6% 30.0% 30.0%
Fee Awards (% of recovery)
Mean 21.6% 22.6% 22.9% 22.5%
Median 25.0% 25.0% 25.0% 25.0%
25th Percentile 17.8% 20.0% 17.0% 18.0%
75th Percentile 25.0% 25.0% 30.0% 27.0%
Ratio of Fee Award to Fee
Request
Mean 0.993 0.943 0.933 0.950
Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Cases with Fee Reductions 1 9 14 24
Cases with Identified No. of
Objectors to Settlement
0 24 28 51 103
1 8 3 7 18
2 0 0 2 2
3 0 1 3 4
4 0 1 0 1
5 or More 0 3 3 6
Cases with Fee Objections 5 8 12 25
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For each case in our sample, we looked for evidence of ex ante
fee negotiations between lead plaintiff candidates and the lawyers
they retained. We also sought to learn whether judges considered
evidence of fee negotiations when appointing lead plaintiffs, selecting
class counsel, or awarding fees at the end of litigation. Specifically, we
examined: (1) all motions for appointment of lead plaintiff and class
counsel, along with all supporting memoranda and other documents;
(2) court orders appointing lead plaintiffs and approving class counsel;
(3) all motions, supporting memoranda, and other documents
requesting an award of attorneys' fees; (4) any filed objections to the
settlement, including to the proposed attorneys' fees; and (5) court
orders granting final approval to the settlement and awarding
attorneys' fees.
B. Empirical Findings
1. Evidence and Judicial Consideration of Ex Ante Fee Agreements
We found little evidence that ex ante fee agreements play a
significant role in selecting the lead plaintiff. As we noted earlier, a
handful of courts have held that evidence that a proposed lead
plaintiff engaged in serious, arm's length negotiations with
prospective counsel is relevant in determining whether the lead
plaintiff candidate can adequately represent the class. 64 Those
decisions, however, were few and far between in the reported cases, a
pattern which was repeated in our sample. Discussions of fee
arrangements were virtually nonexistent in our data set. Only 3 of the
134 orders appointing lead plaintiffs (2.24%) mentioned ex ante fee
negotiations. No doubt the irrelevance of this factor in selecting the
lead plaintiff derives from the PSLRA's statutory language, which
makes the size of the lead plaintiffs financial stake in the litigation
the overwhelming consideration.6 5
This statutory language may also help explain our similar
finding regarding the frequency with which lead plaintiff candidates
raised ex ante negotiations in their moving papers. In only 9.7% of
cases did any lead plaintiff candidate mention such negotiations or
64. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (discussing a Third Circuit case in which
the Court stated that willingness "to select competent class counsel and to negotiate a reasonable
retainer agreement with that counsel" could determine which lead plaintiff would "fairly and
adequately represent[] the interests of the class").
65. See supra note 54 and accompanying text ('The key issue in applying the most
adequate plaintiff presumption is determining which plaintiff has the largest financial interest
in the relief sought by the class.").
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any resulting fee agreement. Of course, simply because a set of moving
papers is silent on fees is not definitive evidence that fee negotiations
never occurred. Perhaps any agreement on fees was sufficiently vague
that counsel did not think that referencing it would significantly
enhance the argument in favor of the proposed lead plaintiffs
adequacy. We also spoke to several plaintiffs' lawyers, and they
universally expressed concern that disclosure to defendants of fee
arrangements (particularly the fee breakpoints or tiers in the
agreement) might disadvantage them in settlement negotiations. 66
Thus, even in cases in which a fee agreement has been negotiated ex
ante and the lawyers would be permitted to submit their fee
agreements to the court under seal, the fear of (inadvertent) disclosure
may cause lawyers to shun public discussion of fee arrangements at
the lead plaintiff appointment stage.
There is evidence that ex ante fee agreements play a greater,
albeit still small, role at the fee award stage. In 17 of the 134 cases
(12.7% of the sample), lead counsel argued that the presence of a
negotiated ex ante fee agreement with the lead plaintiff justified its
requested fee. Evidence in the record of an ex ante fee agreement is
most prevalent when a public pension fund is the lead plaintiff.67
Evidence of such an agreement was present in 18.75% of cases with
public-pension lead plaintiffs compared to just over 9% of cases for
both other institutional-investor lead plaintiffs and individual lead
plaintiffs.68
66. Interviews with Anonymous Securities Class Action Lawyers (Jan. 21, 2013 and Nov.
16, 2012) (notes on file with authors). In conversations, several securities class action lawyers
assured us that large institutional investors bargain over fees routinely. Id. They added that
they and their clients prefer to keep the terms of fee agreements confidential, however. Id. In
cases involving public pension funds, such agreements may nonetheless be a matter of public
record due to state open records laws.
67. Our data is limited to the documents filed in the cases in our data set. It is possible
that ex ante fee agreements existed in other of these cases but that the agreements were simply
not referenced in any of the papers filed in the litigation. That raises the interesting question of
why the lead plaintiff and/or its chosen counsel might prefer not to provide this information to
the Court, a question that we take up in Part III.C below.
68. Due to the small sample size, these differences were insignificant at traditional levels.
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Figure 1
Fee Requests in Cases with and without Ex Ante Agreements
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Fee requests and settlements are leg-transftmed and In constant 2012 dolarn.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between fee requests and
settlement size in cases with and without ex ante agreements. There
are several important differences between the two subsamples. For
cases without ex ante agreements, overall fee requests (measured as a
percentage of the recovery) averaged 25.4%. Consistent with previous
studies of fee awards in securities class actions, however, there is
substantial variation with settlement size.69 Measured as a percentage
of recovery, fee requests decline as settlements increase. In the
smallest quartile of settlements, fee requests in cases without ex ante
agreements averaged 28.4%. Average requests in the next three
quartiles, however, dropped to 27.5%, 24.1%, and 20.9%, respectively.
The range of settlement sizes in cases without an ex ante agreement is
also quite large. The smallest inflation-adjusted settlement was just
$599,000; the largest was $314.7 million. With only a few exceptions,
the fee requests in cases without ex ante agreements tend to be
clustered along the upper frontier, (i.e., at the highest amount for any
given settlement size).
69. See, e.g., Perino, supra note 7, at 381 (finding that settlements were significantly larger
in cases with public pension lead plaintiffs than in those with non-institutional lead plaintiffs).
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By contrast, fee requests in cases with ex ante agreements
averaged just 13.2%, a difference that is significant at less than 0.1%.
While average requests in ex ante cases are smaller than in cases
without such agreements, they too appear to decline as settlement size
increases. In the second quartile of cases, fee requests averaged 14.2%.
In the largest quartile they averaged 9.2%.70 Unlike the requests in
the subsample of cases without ex ante agreements, few of the cases
with agreements are on the upper frontier. Most requests are well
below the requests in the no-agreement cases at any given settlement
size.
Settlements in cases with ex ante fee agreements are, on
average, about three times larger than the settlements in cases
without such agreements, with a range that is shifted considerably to
the right.71 The smallest inflation-adjusted settlement is $4.3 million
(about seven times larger than the smallest settlement in the
subsample of cases without such agreements). The largest is $641
million (twice as large as the largest settlement in the no-agreement
subsample). The absence of smaller cases with ex ante agreements is
actually even starker than these figures suggest because of the way
we recorded settlement data. In cases with partial settlements, each
settlement is a separate entry in our database. The smallest
settlement with an ex ante fee agreement was a partial settlement in
In re Homestore.com, Inc. Securities Litigation.72 Aggregated together,
however, the five Homestore.com settlements were just over $145.5
million, which hardly constitutes a small case. Besides these partial
settlements, there are no cases with an ex ante fee agreement with a
settlement below $10 million.
70. In the third quartile, fee requests actually increased to 16.4%, but this appears to be an
anomaly from our small sample of ex ante cases.
71. The average settlement in cases without ex ante fee agreements was $28.9 million,
compared to an average of $144 million in the cases with such agreements. This difference is
significant at less than 0.1%.
72. See Declaration of Nancy L. Fineman in Support of Lead Plaintiffs Motion for: (1) Final
Approval of Class Settlement with Cendant and Richard A. Smith; (2) Approval of Plan of
Allocation; (3) Approval of Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses; (4)
Approval to Distribute Claims Administration Funds; and (5) Approval of Timing of Distribution
at 1, 6, In re Homestore.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 01-CV-11115 (C.D. Cal.) (Declaration filed Feb.
29, 2009; case filed Dec. 27, 2001) (referencing ex ante fee agreement). This partial settlement
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We see the same pattern when we look at fee awards (Figure
2). Average fee awards in cases without ex ante agreements were
23.9% but dropped as settlement size increased. In cases with ex ante
agreements, fee awards were significantly lower (13.0%) and declined
over the range of settlements.73 The distributions were also
substantially similar. Fee awards in cases without evidence of
agreements were, for the most part, clustered on the upper frontier
while awards in cases with agreements tended to be substantially
lower at equivalent settlement sizes.
There is some evidence that courts showed greater deference to
fee requests that are the product of an ex ante agreement. To make
this determination, we calculated the ratio of the fee award to the fee
request. For cases without an ex ante agreement, courts awarded on
average 94.4% of the fees the lead counsel requested, compared to
99.1% in cases with an ex ante agreement. 74 Judges cut the fee request
in only 1 of 17 cases with ex ante agreements (5.9%) compared to 23 of
117 cases without such agreements (19.7%). Given the small number
73. The difference in means was significant at less than 0.1%.




of cases with ex ante agreements, this difference in the frequency of
fee cuts is not statistically significant.7 5
Even absent evidence of an ex ante agreement, courts seem to
defer to the fees proposed in cases with obviously sophisticated lead
plaintiffs. In cases with public pensions as lead plaintiffs, courts cut
fees only 6.3% of the time, significantly less frequently than in cases
with other kinds of institutional lead plaintiffs (23.3%) or in cases
with individuals as the lead plaintiffs (25.6%).76 The ratio of award to
request was significantly higher in the public pension fund cases
(99.0%) than in the cases with individual lead plaintiffs (92.8%).77
Because public pension funds are the most likely to have ex ante fee
arrangements,78 these results provide indirect evidence that courts
defer to negotiated fee agreements in securities class actions.
While these are just summary statistics and thus do not control
for, among other things, settlement size or the greater percentage of
public pension funds in cases with ex ante fee agreements,79 they do
raise some intriguing possibilities. Courts awarding fees in class
actions have frequently expressed concern that their fee awards are
inherently imprecise because they do not know what fee arrangements
sophisticated plaintiffs would reach if they were able to engage in
arm's length negotiations with class counsel. Given the small sample
we have been able to obtain, we need to interpret these data with
caution. Nonetheless, it appears that the concerns courts have
expressed were well founded-fees that are the product of ex ante
agreements appear to be sharply lower than the fees courts award in
securities-fraud class actions without such agreements.
To further test these relationships, we ran regressions with the
fee request and the fee award as dependent variables (Table 2). In
addition to an indicator variable for the presence of an ex ante fee
75. A chi-square test yielded a probability of 0.166.
76. These differences are significant at less than 5% (chi square = 6.995, probability
0.03). The other institutions that we coded for in the data set were union-affiliated funds and
private institutions.
77. In a comparison between public pension funds and all other lead plaintiffs, the
difference in ratio of award to request was significant (probability = 0.007). We compared mean
ratios for cases led by public pension funds, other institutional investors, and individuals. While
the ratio was lower for other institutions (95.2%), only the difference between public pension
funds and individuals was significant (probability = 0.004).
78. See Interviews with Anonymous Securities Class Action Lawyers, supra note 66 (noting
that as public entities, these funds are subject to various requirements of state law in order to
retain and pay outside counsel).
79. Perino, supra note 7, at 369 (finding that, all thing being equal, cases with public




agreement, 0  the independent variables include five case
characteristics that prior studies have shown are correlated with fee
requests and awards: (1) the inflation-adjusted settlement amount; (2)
the age of the case; (3) the presence of a public pension fund or other
institutional investor as lead plaintiff; (4) the presence of certain law
firms; and (5) the district in which the case was litigated. To simplify
interpretation of the regression coefficients, we report fee requests and
fee awards as a percentage of the settlement amount.81
80. We coded cases as 1 if the motion for a fee award referenced an ex ante fee agreement
and 0 otherwise. Our measure may thus be biased to the extent that the case involved such an
agreement but the moving papers did not discuss it.
81. We reran the regressions using log-transformed fee requests and fee awards reported in
constant 2012 dollars. There was no change in the significance of the variables of interest. Some
prior studies on attorneys' fees in class actions transformed these proportions using either
square roots or log odds. See Choi et al., supra note 7, at 895; Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 27, 61-62 (2004). As a robustness check, we reran all the regressions using both
transformations. Again, there was no change in the significance of the relevant variables.
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Table 2: Regressions for Fee Request and Fee Award 82
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
Request Request Award Award
Settlement -0.013*** -C.013***
(0.003) (0.004)
Mean Settlement -0.013*** -0.013***
(0.003) (0.004)
Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Public Pension -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.065*** -0.065***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Other Institution -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.013
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Ex Ante Agreement -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.091*** -0.091***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
Bernstein Litowitz 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Milberg & Successors 0.004 0.004 -0.007 -0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
N.D. Cal. -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
S.D.N.Y. 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Fee Cut -0.063*** -0.063***
(0.014) (0.014)
Constant 0.501*** 0.285*** 0.491*** 0.277***
(0.053) (0.015) (0.059) (0.016)
Observations 133 133 133 133
R-squared 0.630 0.630 0.563 0.563
1700
82. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Settlement is log-transformed and in constant 2012 dollars. Sources: Stanford Law School,
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, Bloomberg, PACER.
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Model 1 in Table 2 shows that, even when controlling for these
variables, the presence of an ex ante fee agreement is negative and
significant, both statistically and economically. To give a clear sense of
the magnitude of these effects, Model 2 centers the regression at the
mean settlement size in the database ($43.5 million). In such a case,
average fee requests in cases without an ex ante agreement were
28.5% (or $12.4 million). By contrast, mean fee requests in cases with
a fee agreement were 19.6% (or $8.5 million), a 31% reduction in the
fee requested.
Consistent with prior studies, we find the presence of a public
pension lead plaintiff is correlated with significantly lower fee
requests. On average, cases with public pension lead plaintiffs have
fee requests that are 6.9% lower than cases with other lead plaintiff
types, a reduction of $3.0 million at the mean settlement amount.
There are, in addition, two other notable findings in Models 1 and 2.
First, other institutions (which are defined to include union-affiliated
funds and private institutions) have no significant impact on fee
requests. Their fee requests are, in other words, statistically
indistinguishable from the reference category of individual lead
plaintiffs. Second, the size of the ex ante effect is roughly similar to
the public pension effect. At mean settlement values, cases with public
pension funds as the lead plaintiff have average fee requests of 21.6%
compared to 19.6% in cases with ex ante agreements.
It is important to emphasize that the variables Ex Ante and
Public Pension are not necessarily measuring separate effects. About
19% of the cases with public pension lead plaintiffs in our sample had
evidence of an ex ante agreement, compared to 9.3% of the cases with
other kinds of lead plaintiffs. Our informal interviews with plaintiffs'
attorneys revealed that, in their experience, some form of ex ante
agreement is present in virtually all cases with public pension lead
plaintiffs. These two variables are therefore likely measuring some
variation of the same thing-the impact that a sophisticated and
engaged lead plaintiff has on fee requests.
Models 3 and 4 repeat these regressions with the fee award as
the dependent variable. The only other difference in these models is
that we have added an indicator variable (Fee Cut), which takes a
value of 1 if the court cut the requested fee and 0 otherwise. Including
this variable allows us to assess the comparative effects on fee awards
of public pension funds, ex ante agreements, and judges.
The variable Ex Ante is negative and significant in the models
for fee awards. At the mean settlement size, the average fee award in
a case without an ex ante agreement was 27.7% ($12.049 million)
compared to 18.6% ($8.091 million) in a case with such an agreement.
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As in the models for fee requests, the public-pension variable remains
statistically significant in the models for fee awards.83 At mean
settlement values, the average public-pension case has a fee award of
21.2%. These reductions in average fee awards suggest that
substantial economic benefits might accrue if courts were to insist on
ex ante bargaining over fees between the lead plaintiff and its chosen
counsel.
Perhaps the most notable feature of the fee-award models is
the result for the variable Fee Cut. It is hardly surprising that this
variable is negative and significant. What is somewhat surprising is
the average size of the effect. All else being equal, when a court cuts
fees, the award is 6.3% lower. In other words, at mean settlement
values, average fees drop from 27.7% to 21.4%. The magnitude of this
effect is thus nearly identical to the magnitude of the Public Pension
and Ex Ante effects. The key difference, of course, is when in the case
they occur. Public pension fund bargaining and ex ante fee
agreements occur when the case commences, which permits the
lawyers some fair degree of certainty about the fee that they will
obtain and promotes an efficient level of investment in the case. In
contrast, predicting when or if courts will cut fees is much more
difficult, as we discuss in more detail below.
2. Judicial Reductions of Requested Fees
In 24 of the 134 cases studied (17.9%), the court awarded a
smaller fee than lead counsel requested. 84 This result is striking, given
83. Other institutional investors again have no statistically significant correlation with fee
awards as compared to the reference group of individual investors.
84. There were two other cases that arguably involved fee reductions but which we decided
not to count as "fee cut" cases for purposes of our analysis. In one case, In re FuWei Films
Securities Litigation, class counsel requested a fee of one-third of the gross settlement fund. See
Memorandum of Law in Support of Lead Plaintiffs Motion For: (1) Final Approval of Proposed
Class Action Settlement; and (2) Award of Counsel Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 2, In
re FuWei Films Sec. Litig., No., 07-CV-9416 (S.D.N.Y.) (Memorandum filed March 28, 2011; case
filed October 19, 2007) [hereinafter FuWei Films]. The Court stated in its order that it was
granting the fee request but then ordered a fee of 33.0% rather than 33.33%. Order Awarding
Lead Plaintiffs Counsel Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 1, FuWei Films
(Order filed April 27, 2011). In the other case, In re Giant Interactive Group, Inc. Securities
Litigation, class counsel initially requested a fee of 33.0% of the gross settlement fund. See Lead
Plaintiffs' Counsel's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees
and Expenses and Plaintiff Awards at 1, In re Giant Interactive, No. 07-CV-10588 (PAE)
(S.D.N.Y.) (Memorandum filed Oct. 5, 2011; case filed Nov. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Giant
Interactive Group]. In awarding the attorneys 33.0% of the net settlement fund, the Court stated
in its order that although the attorneys' had originally requested a fee of 33.0% of the gross
settlement fund, they had revised their request to 33.0% of the net settlement fund after the
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that the fees requested were implicitly, if not always explicitly, agreed
to by the lead plaintiff who, by definition, is the "most adequate
plaintiff' with the largest financial stake in the litigation. Moreover,
in only 2 of the 24 cases did an objector formally challenge the size of
the requested fee.8 5 Thus, in 91.7% of the cases in which the court cut
the requested attorneys' fees, the court did so sua sponte, without the
lead plaintiff or any other class member questioning the size of the fee
request.
The requested fees in these 24 cases ranged from 19.25%86 to
33.33%,87 with the fee awards ranging from 7.0%88 to 30.0%.89 The
Court explained to them that it prefers to award fees as a percentage of the net, rather than
gross, settlement fund. See Memorandum & Order at 15 & n.4, Giant Interactive Group
(Memorandum & Order filed Nov. 2, 2011). Because the attorneys could have requested a net
amount that was equivalent to 33.0% of the gross, but instead chose simply to request 33.0% of
the net, we considered that their sincere request. The court did grant that request. Id. at 18.
The 24 cases in our data set that we determined involved fee awards by the court that
were lower than the requests made by class counsel are listed in an appendix to this article.
One of these 24 cases arguably included two fee cuts. In In re Chiron Corporation
Securities Litigation, the Court noted in its Order of January 6, 2009 awarding attorneys' fees
that it had originally (on Nov. 30, 2007) denied preliminary approval of a proposed settlement in
the case because of four concerns including that "the settlement awarded class counsel fees that
were eight to ten times typical fees." Order at 1, In re Chiron Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-04-4293
VRW (N.D. Cal.) (Order filed Jan. 6, 2009; case filed Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Chiron]. The
Court noted that class counsel subsequently "reduced the amount of their fee request, from 25%
to 17% of the [$30 million] settlement." Id. at 2. The Court granted preliminary approval in June
2008. Id. In granting final approval to the settlement pursuant to a hearing on December 3,
2008, however, the Court performed a lodestar cross-check and further reduced class counsel's
fee award to $4.6 million (15.33%) of the $30 million settlement. Id. The primary concern
expressed by the Court when imposing the further fee cut was that the fee request "implied a
multiplier in the range of 4.07-5.15" which the Court believed "exceed levels courts have accepted
as reasonable fees." Id. The fee award of 15.33%, in contrast, "implies a multiplier of 3.67-4.64"
which the Court stated "is still a generous multiplier, [but] it more accurately represents the risk
faced by class counsel and brings the award within the standard range of multipliers." Id. at 26.
For purposes of our analyses, we viewed the original request of a 25% fee, rather than the
revised request of 17%, as the fee request against which we compared the Court's eventual
award of a 15.3% fee.
85. See Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees at 5 & n.2, In re Nuvelo, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C 07-
04056 (CRB) (N.D. Cal.) (Order filed July 6, 2011; case filed Aug. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Nuvelo]
(noting that "[o]nly one class member has objected to the 30% [proposed fee] award, which
objection counsel have addressed"); Order, Chiron, supra note 84, at 9-10 (noting that seven
class members "raised concerns about the proposed settlement" via email including "concern
about high class counsel fees, although none provided detailed explanations of his or her
concerns").
86. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Counsel's Petition for an Award of
Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 2, In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig.,
No. 09-MD-2017 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y.) (Memorandum filed May 31, 2012; case filed July 29, 2008)
[hereinafter Lehman].
87. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of an Award of Attorneys' Fees,
Awards to Lead Plaintiffs, and Reimbursement of Expenses at 1, Ansell v. Laikin, No. CV-10-
09292-PA (AGRx) (C.D. Cal.) (Memorandum filed May 21, 2012; case filed Dec. 3, 2010)
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ratio of award to request in these cases ranged from 0.25 to 0.93; the
largest reduction was 30.0% to 7.6%,90 and the two smallest reductions
were 27.0% to 25.0%91 and 32.4% to 30.0%.92 In the two cases in which
an objector challenged the requested fee, the ratio of award to request
was 0.93 (28.0% to 30.0%),93 and 0.61 (0.25% to 15.3%).94
The lead plaintiffs in the 24 cases with fee reductions were
disproportionately individuals (41.7%), notwithstanding the fact that
[hereinafter National Lampoon]; Notice of Motion and Motion of Lead Plaintiff for an Order
Awarding Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses; Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support Thereof at 2, Rudolph v. UTStarcom, No. 3:07-CV-04578-SI (N.D. Cal.)
(Notice of Motion filed Aug. 7, 2009; case filed Sept. 4, 2007) [hereinafter UTStarcom];
[Corrected] Notice of Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion
for Final Approval of Settlement and Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses at 1, 15, Mongeli v.
Terayon Commc'ns Sys., Inc., No. 4:06-cv-03936-CW (N.D. Cal.) (Notice of Motion filed Sept. 4,
2008; case filed June 23, 2006) [hereinafter Terayon]; Notice of Motion and Motion for Award of
Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Costs and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support at 2, In re ShoreTel, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-08-00271-CRB (N.D. Cal.) (Notice of Motion
filed Sept. 10, 2010; case filed Jan. 15, 2008) [hereinafter ShoreTel].
88. Judgment and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice at 11, Lifschitz v. Hexion Specialty
Chems., Inc., No. 08-CV-6394 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y.) (Judgment filed May 19, 2010; case filed July 17,
2008) [hereinafter Hexion].
89. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 9, In re Sadia S.A. Sec. Litig., No. 08-CV-9528
(SAS) (S.D.N.Y.) (Memorandum Opinion filed Dec. 28, 2011; case filed Nov. 5, 2008) [hereinafter
Sadia].
90. Lead Counsel's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for an Award of Attorneys'
Fees and Expenses at 1, Kleiman v. RHI Entm't, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-08634-AKH (S.D.N.Y.)
(Memorandum filed Oct. 4, 2011; case filed Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter RHI] (requesting fees of
30% of $2.5 million settlement ($750,000)); Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees and Expenses at 1,
RHI (Order filed Nov. 22, 2011) (ordering fees of 7.6% ($190,000)).
91. Class Counsel's Notice of Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of an Award of Attorney Fees and Expenses at 1, In re Harmonic Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C-
00-2287-PJH (EMC) (N.D. Cal.) (Notice of Motion filed June 2, 2008; case filed June 28, 2000)
[hereinafter Harmonic] (requesting fees of 27% of $15 million settlement); Order Awarding Class
Counsel Attorney Fees and Expenses at 1, Harmonic (filed Oct. 29, 2008) (ordering fees of 25%).
92. Memorandum of Law in Support of Class Counsels' Application for an Award of
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses and An Award of Costs and Expenses to the Class Representatives
at 1, Sadia, supra note 89 (filed Nov. 27, 2011) (requesting fees of 33.33% of net settlement of
$26,276,771.64 ($27 million minus expenses of $723,228.36), which is 32.4% of gross settlement
of $27 million); Memorandum Opinion and Order at 9, Sadia, supra note 89 (awarding 30% of
gross settlement of $27 million).
93. Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees at 1, Nuvelo, supra note 85 (awarding fees of 30% of
the net settlement fund, which was 28% of the gross settlement fund); Plaintiffs' Notice of
Motion and Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses and Awards to Settlement Class
Representatives; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion at viii, 2, Nuvelo,
supra note 85 (filed May 6, 2011) (requesting fees of 30% of the gross settlement fund)).
94. Order at 2, Chiron, supra note 84 (awarding fees of $4.6 million, which was 15.33% of
the $30 million gross settlement); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion
for Preliminary Approval of the Proposed Settlement, the Proposed Plan of Allocation, and
Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 18, Chiron, supra note 84 (filed May 4, 2007)
(requesting fees of 25% of the gross settlement fund).
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individuals were the lead plaintiffs in only 31.9% of the cases in the
larger data set. The other lead plaintiffs in these fee-cut cases were
union funds (33.3%), public pension funds (12.5%), and private
institutions (12.5%). Cases with public pension funds were
significantly less likely to have fee cuts than cases with other kinds of
lead plaintiffs.95
In 29.2% of the fee-reduction cases, the court gave no reason or
justification at all for its decision to award a smaller fee than that
requested. 96 In each of the other 17 cases, the court gave various, often
multiple, reasons for the fee reduction, which are summarized in
Table 3 and detailed in the Appendix. Notably, in none of the cases did
Table 3: Judicial Rationales for Fee Cuts
Rationale Frequency
The requested fee is "too large" 13
The requested fee is "too large given the work performed by the 14
attorneys"
The requested fee is "too large given lead counsel's actual risk of 13
nonrecovery"
The requested fee is "out of line with fees in similar cases" 9
The requested fee fails a lodestar cross-check 7
The court cannot rely on the market for setting attorneys' fees 1
the court offer as a reason for cutting fees that the lead plaintiff and
lead counsel had not bargained at arm's length.97
95. Chi-square = 6.917; probability = 0.009.
96. See Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees and Expenses (filed Nov. 22, 2011), RHI, supra
note 90; Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees, Nuvelo, supra note 85; Order Approving Award of
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses and Plan of Allocation, Terayon, supra note 87; Order and Final
Judgment, Ladmen Partners, Inc. v. Globalstar, Inc., No. 07-CV-0976 (S.D.N.Y.) (Order filed
Feb. 22, 2010; case filed Feb. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Globalstar]; Order Awarding Class Counsel
Attorney Fees and Expenses, Harmonic, supra note 91 (Order filed Oct. 29, 2008); Order re:
Award of Fees to Plaintiffs Counsel; Reimbursement of Expenses, In re TVIA, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
No. C-06-06304 RMW (N.D. Cal.) (Order filed July 7, 2008; case filed Oct. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
TVIA]; Order of Final Judgment, In re SLM Corp. Sec. Litig., 08-CV-1029 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y.)
(Order filed Sept. 6, 2012; case filed Jan. 31, 2008) [hereinafter SLMJ.
97. It merits note, however, that in In re Chiron Corporation Securities Litigation, the
Court's order of January 6, 2009, awarding attorneys' fees included discussion of the factors that
prevented the court from granting preliminary settlement approval in November 2007. The
Court noted that it
was concerned that the lead plaintiff, International Union of Operating Engineers
Local 825, would not fairly and adequately represent all class members because of its
relationship with class counsel and its involvement as lead counsel in other securities
class action lawsuits. . . . These concerns were resolved when the court certified Local
825 as lead counsel [sic] on June 18, 2008 ....
Order, Chiron, supra note 84, at 27.
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The seven cases (two from the Southern District of New York
and five from the Northern District of California) in which the court
gave no reason for cutting the requested fee involved seven different
judges, three of whom were involved in multiple cases involving fee
reductions (Hellerstein, two cases; Breyer, three cases; Pauley, two
cases). Each of these judges, however, gave reasons for reducing fees
in their other cases. Among the seven cases in which no justification
for the fee cut was given, four cases had a ratio of award to request of
0.90 or greater, indicating a relatively small fee cut.98 The other three
cases, however, included the case with the largest fee cut (0.25 ratio of
award to request). 99 In three of these seven cases, the lead plaintiff
was an individual, while the others were private institutions (two),
union funds (one), and a public pension fund (one).
98. Compare Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees at 10-11 (filed July 6, 2011) (awarding fees of
28% of the gross settlement fund), Nuvelo, supra note 85, with Plaintiffs' Notice of Motion and
Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses and Awards to Settlement Class
Representatives; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion at viii (filed May
6, 2011) (requesting fess of 30% of the gross settlement fund), Nuvelo, supra note 85, resulting in
a ratio of 0.93. Compare Order and Final Judgment at 5 (filed Feb. 22, 2010) (awarding fees of
18.33% of the gross settlement fund ($275,000 of a $1.5 million gross fund)), Globalstar, supra
note 96, with Lead Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Support of An Award of Attorneys' Fees
and Reimbursement of Expenses at 1 (filed Feb. 4, 2010) (requesting fees of 20% of the gross
settlement), Globalstar, supra note 96, resulting in a ratio of 0.92. Compare Order Awarding
Class Counsel Attorney Fees and Expenses at 1 (filed Oct. 29, 2008) (awarding fees of 25% of the
gross settlement fund), Harmonic, supra note 91, with Class Counsel's Notice of Motion and
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of an Award of Attorney Fees and Expenses
at 1 (filed June 2, 2008) (requesting fees of 27% of the gross settlement fund), Harmonic, supra
note 91, resulting in a ratio of 0.93. Compare Order of Final Judgment at 5 (filed Sept. 6, 2012)
(awarding fees of 22.5% of the gross settlement fund ($7.875 million of a $35 million gross fund)),
SLM, supra note 96, with Memorandum of Law in Support of Lead Plaintiff SLM Ventures'
Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of Litigation Expenses at 1 (filed May
28, 2012) (requesting fees of 25% of the gross settlement fund), SLM, supra note 96, resulting in
a ratio of 0.90.
99. Compare Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees and Expenses at 1 (filed Nov. 22, 2011)
(awarding 7.6% of the gross settlement fund ($190,000 on a gross settlement of $2.5 million)),
RHI, supra note 90, with Lead Counsel's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for an
Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses at 1 (filed Oct. 4, 2011) (requesting fees of 30% of the
gross settlement fund), RHI, supra note 90, resulting in a ratio of 0.25. Compare Order
Approving Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses and Plan of Allocation at 2 (filed Sept. 23,
2008) (awarding fees of 25% of the gross settlement), Terayon, supra note 87, with [Corrected]
Notice of Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Final
Approval of Settlement and Award of Attorneys' Fees and Expenses at 1 (filed Sept. 4, 2008)
(requesting fees of 33-1/3% of the gross settlement fund), Terayon, supra note 87, resulting in a
ratio of 0.75. Compare Order re: Award of Fees to Plaintiffs Counsel; Reimbursement of
Expenses at 2 (filed July 7, 2008) (awarding fees of 22.8% of the gross settlement fund ($650,000
of a gross fund of $2.85 million)), TVIA, supra note 96, with Notice of Motion and Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Lead Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses
and an Award to Lead Plaintiff at 2 (filed Jan. 4, 2008) (requesting fees of 27.2% of the gross
settlement fund), TVIA, supra note 96, resulting in a ratio of 0.84.
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As noted in the Section above, courts showed greater deference
to fee requests that were the product of ex ante agreements. For cases
without an ex ante agreement, courts awarded on average 94% of the
fees the lead counsel requested, compared to 99% in cases with an ex
ante agreement. 100 Judges cut the fee request in only 1 of 17 cases
with ex ante agreements (5.9%), compared to 23 of 117 cases without
such agreements (19.7%).
In the lone case (In re Escala Securities Litigation) in which the
court cut the requested fees notwithstanding the existence of an ex
ante fee agreement, the court made no reference to the agreement in
its fee order. 101 Nor did the court explain why it awarded less than the
requested fee notwithstanding the fact that the reduction was
relatively large (0.82 ratio of award to request). The blame for this
jurisprudential lapse cannot entirely be placed on the court, however,
since its fee order was simply the order proposed by lead counsel with
the fee award amount written in (and the word "proposed" in the title
of the order crossed out). As drafted by lead counsel, the two-page
order did give the following list of factors in support of the fee amount,
none of which the court crossed out or otherwise altered:
The court finds such an award to be fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this
case, in light of, among others, the following factors:
*the time and labor expended by counsel;
*the magnitude and complexities of the litigation;
othe risk of the litigation;
ethe quality of the representation; and
ethe requested fee in relation to the settlement.102
One is left to infer that the court, upon consideration of these
factors, simply came to a different determination than the lead
plaintiff and its chosen counsel regarding the value of the attorneys'
services, notwithstanding the existence of an ex ante fee agreement
between the sophisticated lead plaintiff (a public pension fund) and its
counsel and the absence of any indication that the lead plaintiff now
regretted having entered into that contract or any filed objection to
the requested fee.
100. A one-tailed test showed that this difference in means was significant at the 10% level
(probability = 0.084).
101. Order Granting Application for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Reimbursement of
Expenses, In re Escala Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 06-cv-3518 (AKH) (S.D.N.Y) (Order filed Dec. 3,
2008; case filed May 9, 2006) [hereinafter Escala Group].
102. Id. at 1.
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C. What Explains These Empirical Findings?
Our empirical findings raise at least two broad categories of
questions: Why are there so few reported instances of ex ante fee
agreements between the lead plaintiff and its chosen counsel? And
why are courts so frequently cutting the fees requested by class
counsel and approved by the lead plaintiff? In this Section, we take up
each of these questions in turn.
With regard to the first question, it is important to note that
our data can tell us only if the existence of an ex ante fee agreement
was reported in the public filings in a case. In some cases, the lead
plaintiff and its counsel may have entered into an ex ante fee
agreement but never referenced that agreement in any of the motions,
memoranda, or declarations/affidavits filed with the court. It is also
possible, but much less likely, that in some cases an ex ante fee
agreement was presented to the court ex parte and in camera and
never noted on the docket sheet for the case. Thus, we must ask
several different questions regarding these data.
If lead plaintiffs are in fact only rarely negotiating ex ante fee
agreements with their chosen counsel, why are they not doing so more
often? One possible answer is that courts have not required lead
plaintiffs to provide evidence of such an agreement either when
applying to be the lead plaintiff or in the context of reviewing the
eventual request for attorneys' fees. But a lead plaintiff would
presumably seek to negotiate such an agreement anyway if it thought
there was an advantage in doing so. Perhaps the lead plaintiff believes
that there is no reason to enter into an ex ante agreement regarding
attorneys' fees because the fees will ultimately be set by the court at
the end of the representation. But by contracting ex ante, the lead
plaintiff would arguably be able to establish a firm cap on the fees
that it (and the class) might be obligated by the court to pay.
Alternatively,- perhaps the lead plaintiff is of the view that it
will nonetheless be more advantageous to wait until the end of the
representation to negotiate with class counsel regarding its fee. By
waiting, the lead plaintiff will have more information regarding both
the services provided by counsel and the terms of the proposed
settlement. In addition, the lead plaintiff will have even more
bargaining power at the end of litigation than at the outset, since class
counsel, when making its fee request to the court, will need the
support of the lead plaintiff (expressly or at least tacitly in the form of
no explicit objection).
A final possibility is that many lead plaintiffs simply are not
performing the function that Congress envisioned when it created the
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PSLRA. Only 36% of the cases in our data set involved public pension
funds as lead plaintiffs. The remainder had some combination of
traditional individual plaintiffs or other kinds of institutional
investors, such as union-affiliated funds. As our study and others have
shown, only public pension funds are correlated with significantly
lower fee requests and awards. 103 Thus, perhaps the remaining cases
exhibit the same kind of lawyer domination that existed before the
passage of the PSLRA. If the lead plaintiffs in these cases are indeed
largely figureheads, then it is hardly surprising that they would not
bargain hard with counsel to establish a fee arrangement at the start
of the case.
This, of course, raises questions about why the lead plaintiffs
chosen counsel would be willing to invest time and resources without
any certainty regarding at least the minimum percentage fee that the
lead plaintiff would support. Precisely because the support (or, at
least, the non-objection) of the lead plaintiff will be needed at the time
class counsel makes its fee request to the court, one might expect the
counsel to want some firm assurances on this issue before investing in
the case. Indeed, if a very aggressive lead plaintiff sought to impose a
no-ex-ante-fee-agreement condition when selecting among possible
candidates for class counsel, an experienced, high-quality law firm
might prefer to just invest its time and resources in a different project.
(Moreover, law firms might interpret such a condition on the counsel's
employment as a signal that the lead plaintiff intends to support only
an unusually low fee award at the end of the case.)
Another possibility is that class counsel is not keen to enter
into a formal, written fee agreement ex ante, believing that such an
agreement could only serve to limit an eventual fee request to the
court. Counsel might also believe that any such agreement is
immaterial, given that the final fee award is ultimately a decision for
the court. Even so, such an agreement, if made known to the court,
would seem likely to only help class counsel: it would frame the court's
decision and arguably obligate the court to explain any decision to
deviate downward from the ex ante agreement when reducing the fee.
Moreover, if the court did award a fee lower than the one stipulated in
the ex ante agreement, class counsel would seem to have a stronger
case (or at least an additional set of arguments) if it chose to appeal
the court's fee cut. In this context, the existence of an ex ante fee
agreement would further mitigate any concern that class counsel was
103. See Perino, supra note 7, at 385, 389 (finding that public pension fund lead plaintiffs
are correlated with significantly lower fee requests and awards).
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acting adversely to the class in appealing a sua sponte fee cut by the
court. Class counsel would simply be seeking enforcement of a valid
contract with the lead plaintiff, a contract about which the lead
plaintiff had expressed no concerns and to which (in the vast bulk of
cases) no other class member had formally objected.
Of course, it is possible that a law firm would be better off
without an ex ante agreement, particularly in cases without active
public pension fund monitoring. Consider, for example, a case
involving an average-sized settlement in which there is no public
pension fund participation and no ex ante fee agreement. Our analysis
shows that settlements in those cases have average fee awards of
27.7%.104 The average fee cut is 6.3%, with cuts occurring in 17.9% of
the cases. In cases with ex ante agreements, fee awards average
18.6%, and cuts occur in 5.9% of the cases. While having an ex ante
agreement reduces the likelihood of a fee cut from about 1 in 5 to
about 1 in 20, a simple expected return calculation shows that the
lawyer is still better off without the ex ante agreement. The expected
fee in a case without an agreement is 26.5% compared to 18.2% in
cases with an agreement. 05 A rational, risk-neutral repeat player
should thus prefer not to have an ex ante agreement precisely because
it would substantially reduce fees (albeit to the benefit of the class),
and the absence of such an agreement may therefore be evidence of a
substantial agency cost problem.
As we noted previously, it is possible that ex ante fee
agreements are negotiated between public pension lead plaintiffs and
their chosen counsel in most cases but that class counsel simply
prefers not to make the terms of the agreement public by filing it with
the court. Class counsel might be concerned that revealing the terms
of the fee agreement would provide the defendant information that it
might be able to use against the class counsel in any eventual
settlement negotiations (i.e., information identifying the breakpoints
in an agreement that provided for different fee percentages depending
on the size of the recovery). To the extent that class counsel is a repeat
player in securities litigation, it might also be concerned that making
104. To be sure, we must use these figures with caution given our small sample size.
Nonetheless, they are useful for illustrative purposes.
105. This analysis assumes that the average fee cut would occur in cases with and without
an ex ante agreement. Recall, however, that we found that courts awarded on average 94% of the
fees the lead counsel requested in cases in which an ex ante fee agreement was not a part of the
record, compared to 99% in cases with an ex ante agreement. A more precise analysis would use
the average fee cut in each subsample. Unfortunately, we have no way of reliably estimating
those figures because our data set contains only one case in which there was both an ex ante
agreement and a fee cut.
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public the terms of its fee agreement in one case would restrict its
ability to negotiate a different (more advantageous) fee arrangement
with future clients. Relatedly, as a repeat player, counsel might be
concerned about giving this fee information to its competitors, and
about the effect the information could have on the larger market for
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in securities cases.
While courts permit fee agreements to be filed in camera and
under seal, class counsel may be concerned that the information will
ultimately become public if, for example, the court were to invoke the
details of the information in its eventual fee order. Another possibility
is that class counsel's estimates of the likelihood of fee cuts or the
extent to which the court will defer to an ex ante agreement differ
from the data we present here.'06 Relatedly, perhaps class counsel is
106. This view is not without basis in the sense that at least some courts have made clear
that the existence of a fee agreement is not to be given any special deference, for example in
terms of a presumption that the court would be obligated to rebut in awarding a lower fee. See,
e.g., Order, Chiron, supra note 84, at 11-12 (filed Jan. 6, 2009) (emphasis added):
"Attorneys' fees provisions included in proposed class action settlement
agreements are, like every other aspect of such agreements, subject to the
determination whether the settlement is 'fundamentally fair, adequate, and
reasonable."' Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 963 (9th Cir. 2003), quoting FRCP
23(e). The court is obligated to conduct an independent inquiry into the reasonableness
of any attorney fee provisions of a class action settlement even in the face of an
agreement between the parties regarding the payment and amount of attorney fees and
costs.
Common fund cases create a situation in which normal reliance on the adversary
process to police the appropriateness of a fee award is unavailing. Report of the Third
Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees (Task Force Report), 108 F.R.D.
237, 251 (3d Cir. 2985). . . . [A] class action defendant has little or no incentive to
contest this amount allocated to attorney fees in a proposed settlement, provided the
total amount of the settlement is acceptable. . . . Task Force Report at 266. "[T]o avoid
abdicating its responsibility to review the agreement for the protection of the class,
the Ninth Circuit requires that a district court must carefully assess the
reasonableness of a fee amount spelled out in a class action settlement agreement."
Staton, 327 F.3d at 963 . . . . This obligation is especially strong if the fee award
appears high. Staton, 327 F.3d at 966.
The court's obligation to ensure the fee award is reasonable exists in part because
class members have little incentive to register complaints about the award. In re
Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 573 (7th Cir. 1992). While a substantial reduction
in the amount class counsel receive as fees creates a larger pool for class members to
share, an individual class member may see only a de minimus increase in his
settlement value. Id. Individual class members may therefore lack the financial
incentive to complain about an excessive fee award. But class members' silence does
not lessen the court's responsibility to ensure that the fee award is fair and
reasonable. Id.
See also Order, In re Chiron Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-04-4293 VRW, 2007 WL 4249902, at *9
(N.D. Cal., Nov. 30, 2007):
The court recognizes that the Seventh Circuit . . . takes a somewhat more
prospective or ex ante approach [to assessing the reasonableness of class counsel fees].
See In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2001); where attorney fees are
not determined up front in a case (and they usually are not), the Seventh Circuit
instructs that the district court "undertake an analysis of the terms to which the
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
not inclined ever to appeal a court's fee award, no matter how large a
deviation from the requested fee it represents, and thus is not
concerned with any benefits on appeal of having provided the trial
court information about the existence and terms of an ex ante fee
agreement. For example, class counsel may fear that appealing a
judicial fee cut will anger the current client and reduce its ability to
secure future business.
Finally, it is possible that class counsel chooses not to provide
information to the court about its ex ante fee agreements with the lead
plaintiff because that agreement contains no more information than is
already included in the notice to the class that was part of the
preliminary approval process (e.g., "Class counsel will request as fees
no more than xx% of the total gross settlement fund."). Or, more
strategically, perhaps class counsel wants to preserve the option to
negotiate more advantageous fee terms with the lead plaintiff at the
end of the litigation, which might prove more awkward if the original
fee agreement was provided to the court at the outset.
This brings us to the second question raised at the beginning of
this Section: Why are courts so frequently cutting the fees requested
by class counsel and approved by the lead plaintiff? As demonstrated
above, in 91.7% of the cases in which the court cut the requested
attorneys' fees, the court did so sua sponte, without the lead plaintiff
or any other class member questioning the size of the fee request.
Additionally, in 29.2% of the 24 cases with fee cuts, the court gave no
reason at all for its decision.
One way to understand what judges might be thinking is to
consider the 34-page order of Judge Vaughn Walker in In re Chiron
Corporation Securities Litigation.107 On the one hand, Judge Walker
clearly put great time and effort into his decision on fees and devoted
private plaintiffs and their attorneys would have contracted at the outset of the
litigation when the risk of loss still existed." Sutton v. Bernard, [504 F.3d 688 (7th Cir.
2007)].
Because a prospective fee negotiation occurs without the plaintiffs and the
attorneys knowing what the recovery will be, if any, and how much of the attorney's
time and expense will be needed to produce a recovery, the Seventh Circuit's approach
is likely to take the form of a percentage approach. But this by no means suggests
that a lodestar cross-check is inappropriate or unnecessary. Indeed, a lodestar cross-
check is extremely useful in that context, because a reasonable percentage fee is not
necessarily a flat or straight percentage. A prudent plaintiff negotiating in advance of
litigation with contingent fee counsel should take account of the economies of scale
inherent in large recoveries and require that counsel share those economies by
demanding a sliding scale percentage. A lodestar cross-check can, therefore, assist a
court attempting to find the reasonable percentage no less than the court attempting
to find reasonable hourly compensation.
107. Order, Chiron, supra note 84 (filed Jan. 6, 2009).
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many pages to discussing what hourly rates to use when calculating
the lodestar, as well as how to determine the proper multiplier. 108
Indeed, with regard to the latter, the judge explicitly paid close
attention to a 2003 study published in Class Action Reports, which set
out the multipliers observed in 353 securities class actions with
recoveries of $50 million or less (the recovery in In re Chiron was $30
million).109 He ultimately determined that a reduction in the fee was
required largely in order to bring the multiplier within the high end of
the historical range for recoveries of comparable size.110 In sum, Judge
Walker did not simply decide that the requested fee was "just too
large" and arbitrarily reduce it to an amount with which he was more
viscerally comfortable.
At the same time, however, Judge Walker's analysis was
premised on the assumption that the fee agreed to by the lead plaintiff
(a union fund) and class counsel 1 should not be given any particular
deference. It is possible that he concluded, without making this
explicit, that the union fund was not monitoring class counsel as
vigorously as the PLSRA intended, and in the absence of such
oversight he needed to undertake de novo review. In any event, Judge
Walker does not appear to have inquired whether the lead plaintiff
and class counsel had entered into an ex ante fee agreement and, if so,
what its terms were. And whatever the explanation, he does not
recognize or acknowledge any distinction between his fee-setting role
in a securities class action under the PSLRA and his fee-setting role in
other types of class actions. In his view, because a court may not rely
on the "normal . . . adversary process," it "is obligated to conduct an
independent inquiry into the reasonableness of any attorney fee
provisions of a class action settlement even in the face of an
108. Id. at 11-34.
109. Id. at 20-21.
110. Id. at 23-26.
11. We do not know if there was an ex ante fee agreement in this case; we do know that
none was reported to exist in the record. In its fee request, however, class counsel did explicitly
note that the requested fee was supported by the lead plaintiff. See Plaintiffs Notice of Motion
and Motion in Support of Final Approval of Settlement, Plan of Allocation and Award of
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses and in Reply to Comments and Objections from Class Members;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at xii & 26 (filed Oct. 29, 2008)
(noting that "Lead Plaintiff submits that the Court should . . . approve Class Counsel's request
for Attorneys' Fees in the reduced amount of $5.1 million or just 17% of the Settlement Amount";
noting that "Lead Plaintiff[ ... agreed to reduce the requested attorneys' fees to 17% from 25%")
(emphasis added), Chiron, supra note 84; see also Lead Plaintiffs Response to Order of April 14,
2008 Re: Modified Terms of Settlement and Class Notice at 1 (filed April 18, 2008) (noting that
"Lead Plaintiff and Lead Counsel will reduce the request for attorneys' fees to be described in the
Class notice from 25% to 17%"), Chiron, supra note 84.
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agreement between the parties regarding the payment and amount of
attorney fees and costs."112
All but two of the authorities Judge Walker cites predate the
enactment of the PSLRA. And neither of the two post-PSLRA cases is
a securities class action."13 Most ironically, the lone securities class
action he cites (Continental Illinois Securities Litigation) to justify his
judicial "obligation to ensure the fee award is reasonable,"1 4 is a 1992
decision of the Seventh Circuit in which Judge Posner wrote the
following for the panel:
It is apparent what the district judge's mistake was. He thought he knew the value of
the class lawyers' legal services better than the market did. What the market valued at
$350 he thought worth only half as much. He may have been right in some ethical or
philosophical sense of "value" but it is not the function of judges in fee litigation to
determine the equivalent of the medieval just price. It is to determine what the lawyer
would receive if he were selling his services in the market rather than being paid by
court order.' 1 5
The object in awarding a reasonable attorney's fee, as we have been at pains to stress, is
to give the lawyer what he would have gotten in the way of a fee in an arm's length
negotiation, had one been feasible ... .116
So far as we know, Judge Walker never asked-either when
appointing the lead plaintiff and approving its choice of counsel, or
when awarding fees to the class counsel-whether the lead plaintiff
and class counsel had undertaken arm's length negotiations at the
outset of the litigation regarding attorneys' fees and, if so, what the
terms of their ex ante agreement were.
D. Are Current Practices Desirable?
Our primary objectives in this study are descriptive. We want
to know how fee award practices operate and whether ex ante fee
112. Order, Chiron, supra note 84, at 11.
113. See id. at 11-12 (citing Staton v. Boeing Co, 327 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2003)) (involving an
award of attorneys' fees in an employment discrimination class action resolved through a consent
decree); Strong v. BellSouth Telecomms. Inc., 137 F.3d 844 (5th Cir. 1998) (involving an award of
attorneys' fees pursuant to the settlement of antitrust class actions brought by customers against
their local telephone company in four states)).
114. Order, Chiron, supra note 84, at 12.
115. In re Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 568 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Missouri v. Jenkins,
491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989); Harsch v. Eisenberg, 956 F.2d 651, 663 (7th Cir. 1992); Bandura v.
Orkin Exterminating Co., 865 F.2d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 1988); Tomazzoli v. Sheedy, 804 F.2d 93,
98 (7th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 323-26 (7th Cir. 1986); Henry v.
Webermeier, 738 F.2d 188, 195 (1984)).
116. Id. at 572.
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agreements influence them. Having learned that " lead plaintiff
candidates rarely bring ex ante agreements to judges' attention and
that these agreements figure in ex post fee setting only slightly more
often, we also have some normative concerns. In this Section, we will
briefly consider the possibility that reforming the fee-setting process
might help investors by making securities class actions more efficient.
The obvious reason for thinking that existing procedures are
suboptimal is that they differ in a key respect from the practice
prevailing in the market where sophisticated clients hire attorneys.
Sophisticated clients typically set lawyers' fees when representations
commence; judges set fees in securities class actions when lawsuits
settle. Insofar as we know, ex ante bargaining occurs in all contexts in
which sophisticated plaintiffs with large financial stakes hire
attorneys, 117 including securities lawsuits brought on an individual
(non-class) basis."18 On the plausible assumption that sophisticated
clients use efficient practices, one may reasonably hypothesize that ex
post fee setting in class actions harms investors by creating deficient
incentives.119
The superiority of ex ante fee setting likely reflects two
considerations. First, it is reasonable to expect that lawyers will make
better decisions throughout a litigation when fee terms are clear than
when they can only guess what they will earn in the event of success.
Fuzzy fee terms may discourage lawyers from taking desirable risks
because they will lack confidence that their returns will exceed their
costs. The known judicial tendency to reduce fee percentages as
plaintiffs' recoveries rise probably strengthens this effect. Second, ex
post fee setting bases lawyers' compensation on risk assessments that
117. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent
Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 360 (2012) (reporting that lawyers and clients always fix fee
percentages and responsibility for expenses up front in patent representations); Stephen D.
Susman, Fee Agreements in Technology Litigation: Harmonizing Client and Attorney Interests,
presented at 20th Annual Technology and Computer Law Conference (May 23-25, 2007)
(providing sample terms used in fee agreements in patent representations, including terms
governing contingent percentages and responsibility for litigation expenses).
118. See In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 264 F.3d 712, 720-22 (7th Cir. 2001) (looking to
securities "benchmarks for determining legal fees"); see also Kevin LaCroix, Ohio Joins the Time
Warner Opt-Out Settlement Parade, D&O DIARY (2007), http://www.dandodiary.com/2007/03/
articles/optouts/ohio-joins-the-time-warner-optout-settlement-parade/ (reporting that the State of
Ohio agreed to pay "a 17.5% contingency fee to Lerach Coughlin" for representation in an opt-out
securities case).
119. Professor Coffee contends that institutional investors that file individual lawsuits after
opting out of a plaintiff class obtain larger recoveries because they can use fee agreements,
including rising scales of percentages negotiated ex ante, to reduce agency costs. See John C.
Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why "Exit" Works Better
Than '%ice,"30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 432 (2008).
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are marred by hindsight bias. Judges who set fees ex post know how
litigation risks played out, so they are likely to underestimate the
magnitude of those risks considerably.12 0 The primary object of
percentage-based compensation is to encourage lawyers to accept
desirable risks; thus it follows that ex post fee setting seems poorly
designed for the task at hand.
By pointing out the deficiencies associated with ex post fee-
setting arrangements, we join a group of commentators who believe
that existing practices should be reformed. 121 Like these writers, we
also have thoughts as to how an ex ante fee setting regime might
work. We expect to develop our views on these subjects at greater
length in subsequent work.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have used publicly available court documents to study the
role that fee agreements play in the process of setting attorneys' fees
in class actions brought under the PSLRA. Our work is preliminary,
incomplete, and subject to important limitations. We focused on three
federal district courts: the Central District of California, the Northern
District of California, and the Southern District of New York. These
courts are disproportionately important because they handle more
securities-fraud class actions than others. But we cannot be confident
that our findings are generalizable because other courts may have
different practices. We studied only cases that closed between 2007
and 2011. Cases that closed in 2012 or that are currently ongoing may
show that fee-setting practices have changed. Most importantly, we
examined court filings, not actual fee agreements. Consequently, we
can quantify the frequency with which judges knew about and
considered ex ante fee agreements, but we cannot assess the rate at
120. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 799-805 (2001) (describing an experiment showing the impact of
the hindsight bias on judges).
121. For criticisms of existing fee-setting arrangements, including proposals to set fees up
front, see THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, SELECTION OF CLASS COUNSEL, 208 F.R.D. 340-427
(2002); THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES, 108 F.R.D. 255 (1986);
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §§ 14.21, 14.211 (2004); ALAN HIRSCH & DIANE
SHEEHEY, AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND MANAGING FEE LITIGATION 113-14 (2d ed. 2005);
ALAN HIRSCH & DIANE SHEEHEY, AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND MANAGING FEE LITIGATION
109-10 (1994); BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, MANAGING CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 33 (3d ed. 2010); BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & CATHERINE
R. BORDEN, MANAGING MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A POCKET
GUIDE FOR TRANSFEREE JUDGES 14 (2011); THOMAS E. WILLGING & NANCY A. WEEKS, ATTORNEY
FEE PETITIONS: SUGGESTIONS FOR ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT 5-8 (1985).
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which lead plaintiffs bargain with lawyers, the intensity of that
bargaining, the terms that emerge, or the impact that ex ante fee
agreements have on lawyers' fee requests. Filed documents rarely
shed much light on these matters, probably because parties think
judges have little interest in them.
This preliminary study does, however, supply information that
may prove useful to judges, securities class action lawyers, and future
lead plaintiffs, and it suggests directions for future research. After
reading this Article, large institutional investors and the lawyers who
represent them may be more eager to resolve fee-related matters when
litigation begins and to present ex ante fee agreements to courts for in
camera review when requesting control of class litigation. Judges'
interest in ex ante fee agreements may also increase, and they may
think it wise to evaluate these agreements when appointing lead
plaintiffs and to give them greater weight when setting fees. In our
view, these changes, which could be implemented without amending
the PSLRA, would have two salutary effects. They would make the
process of setting fees in securities-fraud class actions more
transparent, and they would ground fee awards more solidly in
prevailing market rates rather than in the intuitions and preferences
of individual judges.
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V. APPENDIX
Cases with Fee Cuts
Court/ Lead Gross Objections Awardl 
Reasons
Case Jurge Plaintiff Settlement Fee Fee to Fee Request for
Type (Millions) Request Ratio Cut 22
Cadence ND. Cal. Union Fund $38 0.25 0.19 No 0.76 AB
_______ Conti ________ _______ _____
Children's S.D.N.Y Union Fund $12 0.27 0.15 No 0.56 ABEF
Place Seindlin _______ ___ _____
Chiron N.D. Cal. Union Fund $30 0.25 0.15 Yes 0.61 ABCDF
_______ Walker
Escala N.D.Y. Public Pension $18 0.22 0.18 No 0.82 ABC
Hellerstein______
Forest SN.Y. Union Fund $65 0.245 0.14 No 0.57 ABC
_______ Wood___________
Globalstar S.D. Y. Public Pension $1.5 0.2 0.18 No 0.92
Preska
Harmonic Hamiln ntit tion $15 0.27 0.25 No 0.93
Hexion S.D.N.Y. Individual $18 0.2 0.07 No 0.35 ABCEF
Berman
IMAX Buchwad Ii tion $12 0.25 0.19 No 0.76 ABCE
JA Solar SONY. Individual $4.5 0.3 0.23 No 0.77 EF
KoeltI ___ __ ____ ___
Lehman S Union Fund $40 0.1925 0.13 No 0.67 ABCF
Magma N.D. Cal. Individual $13.5 0.3 0.19 No 0.62 ACE
Brever
Natp C.D. Cal. Individual $1 0.33 0.25 No 0.75 ABCE
Lampoon Anderson _____
NexCen S.D.N.Y. Individual $4 0.3 0.21 No 0.71 ABCE
Cedarbaum ________
NovaGold S.D.N.Y Public Pension $26.78 0.213 0.16 No 0.77 ABCE
Cote ____
Nuvelo N.D. Cal. Individual $8.92 0.3 0.28 Yes 0.93
Brever
RHI S..N.Y. Union Fund $2.5 0.3 0.08 No 0.25
Hellerstein __________ _______________
Sadia S. NlY. Union Fund/ $27 0.324 0.30 No 0.93 BCEF
______ Scheindlin Individual____
ShoreTel N.D Cal. Individual $3 0.33 0.26 No 0.78 AE
Brever
SM SODN.Y. PrivateSLM Pauley Institution $35 0.25 0.23 No 0.9
Terayon NO. Cal. Individual $2.73 0.33 0.25 No 0.75
______ Wilken _______ _____ ____
TVIA N.D. Cal. Individual $2.85 0.272 0.23 No 0.84
________Whvte
UTStarcom D Cal. Individual $9.5 0.33 0.25 No 0.75 BCF
W rer S o U nion F$
Warnert SHa ninFn $16.5 0.275 1 0.18 No 0.65 BC
Chilcot Pauey ___________________ ___
122. Reasons given for fee cut:
A. Requested fee too large.
B. Requested fee too large given work performed.
C. Requested fee too large given actual risk of nonrecovery.
D. Court cannot rely on market for attorneys' fees.
E. Requested fee is out of line with fees in similar cases.
F. Requested fee fails lodestar or other cross-check.
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